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Abstract 
The advent of colonialism witnessed the usurpation of powers of traditional rulers by the invading forces of 
Western Europe in Nigeria and many African countries. During the pre-colonial era, traditional rulers occupied 
crucial positions of authority in Nigeria and many African Kingdoms. They were highly revered and believed to 
be representatives of the gods on earth. In Nigeria, Traditional rulers were the political and spiritual heads of 
the various kingdoms. The pre existing traditional political structure in some parts of Nigeria, no doubt, 
facilitated the implementation of indirect rule system by the British colonial masters. Since the attainment of 
Nigeria’s independence in 1960, traditional rulers hardly feature in the political scene. Successive post 
independence regimes have made tremendous moves to reincorporate the roles of institution in the constitution 
without actualizing it. This paper shall critically x-ray the place of traditional institution under the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The paper shall equally delve into the contemporary trend in 
some other jurisdictions. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION /CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 
Traditional institution simply refers to the indigenous political arrangements whereby leaders with proven track 
records are appointed and installed in line with their native laws and custom to act as custodian of their people’s 
norms, cultures and practices. A traditional ruler is a person who has been appointed to, and occupies the throne 
of an area by virtue of his ancestry in accordance with the established tradition. Traditional leadership is an 
ancient institution prevalent across the entire African continent. In Nigeria, courts have held that the issue as to 
who is eligible to ascend a traditional stool or throne is subject to the customary law and traditions of the people 
concerned which is a question of fact borne out by evidence, unless such custom has assumed a status of 
notoriety for it to be judicially noticed.1  
 
Historically, the African people practiced no other form of governance than traditional leadership. The socio-
cultural norms and traditions embedded in the traditional institutions have remained an integral part of every 
organized society in Africa.2 Apart from being the powerful human tool for survival, the defined cultural norms 
and values also forms the basis for the existence of every civilized society. These norms and values have helped 
in sanitizing the various societies both in the pre and post colonial Nigeria. They also form the basis upon which 
traditional rulers exercised their act of governance, power, authority and influence on their subjects. It was the 
traditional institution of governance that acted as the custodian of customary law, communal assets, such as 
lands, guardian and symbols of cultural values and religions practices, dispensation of justice, enforcement of 
contracts and resolution of conflicts.3  
 
Before the advent of colonialism, most societies in Nigeria and some other African countries were governed 
through the monarchical system of traditional ruler ship. In Nigeria, the monarchs were referred to in various 
names and appellations such as the Oba,4  Emir,5 Obi,6 amongst others. So highly revered because they possess 
elaborate religious and political powers, and regarded as representatives of God, the Supreme Being on earth. 
The forces of imperialism and colonialism have however severally undermined and disintegrated the institution 
of traditional leadership in many African States.  
 
                                                 
1
 See Olaniyan v. Oyewole (2011) 14 NWLR (PT1268) P. 445 
2
  Olaniran O., and Arigun A., Traditional Rulers and Conflict Resolution; An Evaluation of The Pre and Post Colonial 
Nigeria. Online Journal of Research on Hummanities and Social Science Vol.3 No. 21, 2013 p.120. available at www.iiste 
.org accessed on 10/9/2014 
3
 ibid 
4
 In the Yoruba kingdom 
5
 In the Hausa dynasty 
6
 In Igbo land 
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The British system of administration in Nigeria employed the system of indirect rule by which local Chiefs and 
other intermediaries were used. This no doubt accounts for the entrenchment of tradition institutions of 
governance in the pre-colonial Nigerian constitutions1 and succinctly thereafter.2 Unfortunately, recognition of 
traditional institution in the Nigerian Political Sphere was finally extinguished after the 1979 constitution.3 The 
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria did not prescribe any role for traditional rulers.  
 
Conversely, the traditional conception of chieftaincy has today been adulterated in Nigeria. At present, there are 
numerous chieftaincy titles based on the principles of tradition on one hand and another based on the principles 
of modernity and capitalism. Numerous well educated and wealthy Nigerians, particularly, the politicians have 
now acquired chieftaincy titles of various stools which have no nexus with traditions4.  That is why there are 
struggles for traditional title across Nigeria as at today. 
 
In Ghana, South Africa, Uganda, Botswana and other numerous African countries, chieftaincy remains very 
central institution in governance and elaborate recognition is given to this ancient institution. Their sources of 
authority and powers are equally spelt out in the constitution of these countries.  
 
In England, there was in existence a traditional system known as divine right of Kings; a political theory which 
claims that the sovereign is a direct representative of God and has the right to rule absolutely by his royal birth. 
The practice originated from the medieval concept of God’s award of temporal powers to civil rulers and 
spiritual powers to the church. This right was particularly claimed by the early stuart kings in England and 
explains many of their attitudes in the struggle which developed between them and parliaments for political 
sovereignty5. The practice was so highly dominant in the 18th and 19th Century in Europe6.   
 
 
II. TRADITIONAL INSTITUTION IN THE PRE-COLONIAL AND EARLY COLONIAL ERA OF 
NIGERIA 
 
In the pre-colonial era of Nigeria, traditional rulers wield effective powers in their domains. They derived their 
legislative, executive and judicial functions from age long tradition of their people which were recognized and 
revered over time.7  For example, among the Yoruba’s in the South Western part of Nigeria, traditional rulers 
were regarded as representatives of the gods of the land,8 and custodians of the people history and culture. The 
Yoruba traced their origin and kingship to Oduduwa who is generally ascribed to be their ancestral dynasty and 
the ancestor of their numerous crowned kings9.Among the Hausa, Kanuri and other peoples of the Northern 
Nigeria, the Emirs and Shehu wielded strong political power, authority and influence over their domains. In most 
regions, traditional rulers were hardly seen in public places except during a very important function, festivals and 
religious celebrations10 However, there were some parts of Nigeria where chieftaincy institution did exist in pre-
colonial era. This is what operates in the Eastern part of Nigeria, particularly the Igbo Societies which was rather 
                                                 
1
 See the Richard Constitution of 1946, Macpherson constitution of 1951, Littleton Constitution of 1954, the Independent 
constitution of 1960 of Nigeria respectively. 
2
 The 1979 Constitution of Nigeria. 
3
 The invasion of the military into the Nigerian politics in 1966 rapidly contributed to the total annihilation of the traditional 
institution. 
4
 There are plethora of instances across the Nigeria. Even wealthy non natives and sometimes even  
     foreigners have been conferred with various titles across the country.   
5
 Bryan A.G., Blacks Law Dictionary, 9th Edition at p. 549. 
6
 See the Holy Bible in Romans chapter 13 and Daniel Chapter 2vs 21 which was always cited as the  
    source of the authority 
7
  Najeem A.L., The position of Chiefs.  in Yusuf  B. U (ed) Nigerian since Independence: The first 25  
    Years: vol 1 The society (Ibadan: Heineman Education Books, 1989) p.83 see also Amusa S.B, 
      Chieftaincy Festival and Rituals, the role of the Ataoja in the Osun Osogbo Festival in Historical  
     Perspative. In Babawok, T.A, Alao And Adesoji A. (Eds) the Chieftaincy institution in Nigeria (Lagos:  
    Concept Published For Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization, 2010)  p.66. 
8
 Referred to in Yoruba as the Alase Ekeji Orisa 
9
 See Obayemi A.,  The Yoruba and the Edo Speaking Peoples and their Neighbours before 1600ad in JFA  
    Ajayi and M. Crowther Eds. History of West Africa, Vol1 (1976) at pp255-322  
10
 Supra note 9. 
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described as prototypically stateless, a cephalous, or segmentary, consisting of autonomous villages and village 
groups1 ruled by diffused authority without any formalized, permanent or hereditary leadership positions2.  
 
In theory, the offices of traditional rulers in pre-colonial Nigeria were permanent and hereditary. In practice, 
however, they have numerous advisers who aid them in arriving at a consensus on all matters.3  This is because 
most communities established elaborate procedures to curtail autocracy and abuse of powers.4 Analyzing the 
restraints and checks and balances imposed on the powers of pre-colonial traditional rulers, Davies A.E. 
reiterates: 
 
                    Traditional authority in pre-colonial Nigeria whether in the monarchical, associational 
or concillar type was as good, revered and effective as the authority of the Kings in 
Europe and other places that had an organized governmental system. Traditional 
rulers were in theory and in practice defacto and dejure governors of their domain. 
They were not dependent on any higher body to exercise their authority. They were 
not however, absolute rulers as some writers have portrayed them. Rather, their 
authority and political behaviour were limited by institutional restraints conventions 
and customs5  
 
Colonial Nigeria witnessed the influx of the British. The imposition of the British colonial rule on Nigeria 
fundamentally altered the traditional ruler ship system by subordinating it to the imperial powers.  The 
introduction of indirect rule in the Northern Nigeria which was later extended to the Southern part gave the 
traditional rulers the opportunity of participation in governance through the Native Authority. The indirect rule 
did not only strengthen the power of traditional rulers but equally created traditional institutions where it did not 
exist at all6. The British colonialist introduced Warrant Chiefs in Igbo land7  who presided over Native courts 
without recourse to local traditions8.  
 
Convinced by the enormous powers influence and recognition wielded by the traditional rulers, the colonial 
government in Nigeria made moves to give them constitutional backing in the colonial administration. Their 
roles have however metamorphosed as embedded in the various colonial constitutions. 
 
III. TRADITIONAL INSTITUTION AND NIGERIAN 
       CONSTITUTIONAL TIMELINES  
 
(a)  The 1914 Amalgamation  
 
In 1914, the Northern and Southern protectorates of Nigeria were amalgamated. The 1914 constitution of Nigeria 
provided for six Nigerian traditional rulers as unofficial members of the legislature council9. They include two 
Emirs from the North, the Alaafin of Oyo from the South, as well as one member each from Lagos, Calabar and 
the Benin- Warri area. 10  From this period, traditional rulers began to feature and enjoyed constitutional 
recognition throughout the colonial era. However, due to its limited legislative competence, the council failed to 
attract much interest on the part of either the official or the unofficial members.11  
                                                 
1
 Known as Obodo Towns 
2
 See generally, Ifemsia C.C., South Eastern Nigeria in The 19th Century. An Introductory Analysis.(USA:  
    New York  NOK, 1978) 
3
 Ibid  
4
 See Agbese P.O. Chiefs, constitutions and policies in Nigeria p6 available at 
    http://www.chv.up.ac.za/chv.download on 4/9/2014. 
5
 Davies A.E, The fluctuating Fortunes of Traditional Rulers in Nigeria, Plural societies, vol. xix mos. 2&3 
     March (1990) p.138. in Agbese P. O. Ibid P. 6 
6
 For example, in the Eastern Nigeria  
7
  Between 1890 and 1917 
8
 That greatly facilitated the entrenchment of the Indirect Rule System.  
9
 See Adesoji A.O, Traditional Ruler ship and Modern Governance in 20th Century, in: Babawall T.A,  
    Alao and Adesoji (eds) Supra note 9 cited in Amusa S.B, and Ofuafor M.O, Resilence of Tradition in  
    contemporary Politics, A Historical study of the political influence of Traditional Rulers in Nigeria.  
    Current Research Journal of Social Sciences 4 (6) (2012) p. 409. 
10
 Ibid atp. 410. 
11
 See kalu E. Constitutional Developments in Nigeria (London: Cambridge University press, 1964) p.22. 
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(b) The Clifford Constitution of 1922 
Earlier in 1920, a delegation from the National Council of British West Africa (NCBWA) went to London to 
agitate for direct representation on the Nigerian council, amongst others. These demands were openly rejected by 
both the secretary to the state1 and the Governor of Nigeria.2 Despite the refusal, Sir Hugh Clifford initiated the 
first constitutional review by ushering in the Clifford constitution of 1922.3 The constitution introduced elective 
principles which opened new roles for traditional rulers by providing the first opportunity for them to directly 
participate in elective polities. All categories of traditional rulers fielded all the successful towns and legislative 
council candidates from 1923 to 1938. 
 
(c) The Richard constitution of 1946 
Significantly, the Richard constitution of 1946 established a House of Chiefs in the Northern Nigerian and a 
house of Assembly in each of the three regions. The Houses of Assembly is made up of official members 
appointed by the Governor and unofficial members selected by the Native Authorities from amongst 
themselves.4 
 
(d) The MacPherson Constitution of 1951  
 
In 1951, a constitutional order in council known as the MacPherson Constitution was passed. Under the 
constitution, traditional rulers in the west and Northern Nigeria were allowed to make direct input in the 
selection of members of their regional Houses of Assembly. The constitution established regional House of 
Chiefs, in both the North and West. Traditional rulers were represented in the selection of members of the 
National House of Representatives, both directly through the participation of the House of Chiefs as well as 
through indirect means by exerting their influence over the composition of the regional Houses of Assembly. 
Infact, the traditional rulers in both Western and Northern Nigeria were represented in three ways viz; Firstly, by 
according them direct input into the selection of members of the regional Houses of Assembly. Secondly, 
regional Houses of Chiefs were established in both regions and thirdly, traditional rulers were represented in the 
selection of members of the national House of Representatives. 
 
(e) The Littleton Constitution of 1954  
The Littleton constitution, no doubt greatly reduced the constitutional powers of traditional rulers both at the 
centre and in the regions. At the federal level, the constitution divided the legislature into the senate5 and the 
House of Representatives6 who were directly elected. For the first time, the House of Chiefs played no single 
role in the entire process of selecting members of the House of Representatives. The Oba of Lagos was 
automatically included in the senate and most senior Chiefs were automatically included in the regional 
legislature.7 The cabinet or council of ministers at the federal level and the executive council at the regional level 
also provided roles for traditional and appointed rulers8. 
 
It is worthy of note that under the Littleton constitution, traditional rulers were provided with a formal role 
through which they could participate in government. However, these roles were greatly reduced from that 
provided in the prior constitutions. Senior traditional rulers were excluded from standing for elections to either 
the House of Assembly or the House of Representatives by virtue of their automatic membership in the House of 
Chiefs. The status of the House of Chiefs was also lowered below that of the House of Assembly. Thus, even 
                                                 
1
 Louis J.M, Traditional Participants in a Modern Political System – the case for Western Nigeria, Journal of modern African 
studies vol. 18 No 3 1980 p. 444. 
2
 Lord Milner 
3
 Sir Hugh Clifford  
4
 See Win C.R, the Role of Traditional Rulers in Elective politics in Nigeria. Fifth Annual Graduate Students Paper 
Competition, African studies programme, Indian University (1982) p.4. 
5
 Those selected by the Governor were to ensure adequate representation of the minorities which might not  
    otherwise have been included. For example, the Western and Northern Regions accentuated the roles of  
    the Native Authorities and the traditional rulers. In the west, in addition to the unofficial members  
    selected from and by the Native Authorities, the Governor, after due consideration with the Chiefs of the  
    Western provinces appointed three Head Chiefs to the House. See generally Win C.B,  Ibid at p. 9. 
6
 Composed of 12 representatives appointed by the Governors of the regions 
7
 Made up of 320 members 
8
 Winn C.R, Supra  22 atp. 17 
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though they retained their legal position in the governmental structure, their position was rather reversed from 
active participation in policy formulation to mere advisors1 
 
(f) The Independence Constitution of 1960 
Colonial involvement of traditional rulers in politics reached the climax in the late 50’s and during the first 
republic2. During this period, prominent political parties in the three regions began to patronize and lure renown 
traditional rulers through political appointments. In the western region the Obas such as Oba Adesoji Aderemi, 
the Ooni of Ife was appointed as the Governor of the region by the Action Group (AG) in 1959,3 and many 
others were given ministerial appointments.4  
 
Independence eroded the position of traditional rulers in the federal and regional legislature. In the North, the 
council of chiefs was created and chaired by the premier of the North. This was a policy making body whose 
decision was binding on the government. In the western and Eastern regions, minority councils were created 
which were merely advisory without any policy or decision making powers.5 
 
 From the above, it is glaring that the attainment of Nigeria’s independence eroded the powers of traditional 
rulers in the federal and regional legislature in favour of the appointed chiefs. The situation was better in the 
North because the council of chiefs could make a binding policy decision unlike in the Eastern and Western 
regions where they only perform advisory role. 
 
(g) The Republican Constitution of 1963 
Nigeria’s acquisition of a republican status vide the 1963 constitution slightly altered the position of traditional 
rulers.6  
Notably, one of the few specific reference to traditional rulers was cap X11 (miscellaneous) section 1961 
(prohibition of certain legal proceedings) sub section 3 which empower the government to grade chiefs and 
ousting the courts jurisdiction in matters relating to appointment, grading and deposition of chiefs.7  
 
(h) Military Rule, Constitutionalism and Traditional Rulers 
The military coup of 1966 forced the government headed by the prime minister Tafawa Balewa from office.8 By 
this development, the 1963 constitution was suspended and both the legislature and executive powers became 
vested in the federal military government.9 Military rule, no doubt wrought several alteration and modification to 
the powers, role and importance of traditional rulers not withstanding the fact that military governments often 
resort to their counsels on some issues no  formal political role was accorded to them.10 For example, the federal 
and state government take over of local police prisons and native courts in 1968, no doubt alienated the power of 
traditional rulers in the Northern Nigeria. Similarly, the promulgation of the Land use Decree,11 Creation of new 
states and local governments affected the power of traditional rulers in the North.12 The introduction of the local 
government reforms in 1976 by the military completely removed local government administration from 
traditional ruler and placing same in newly created local government councils. Commenting on the impact of the 
1976 local government reform, a scholar said: 
“…….radically altered the locus of traditional rulers vis avis local 
government. The alteration is more vividly epitomized in the concrete 
                                                 
1
. Uche N., the Role of traditional Rulers in emerging Democratic Nigeria in htt://www.gamji.com. accessed  on 9/9/2014 at 
p.5 
2
 Particularly between 1960 and 1966 
3
 See the Guardian July 16, 2007, cited in Amusa S.B and Ofuafor M.O, Supra at p 410 
4
 Such as the Olubadan of Ibadan land, Osemawe of Ondo, Ohiwo of Iwo, Ohi of Warri and a host of others. See generally 
Vanghan O., Nigerian Chiefs Traditional Power in Modern Politics 1980 to 1990s (University of Rochester Press, Rochester, 
2000) at  p. 6-99. 
5
 See Win C.R Supra at p. 21. 
6
 It must be noted that under this republican constitution, the British Queen ceased to be Nigeria’s Head of state and the 
duties of the Governor General were bequeathed on the President. The composition and function of the senate as well as the 
constitution of the regions was not altered.   
7
 See generally the Constitution of the Federation (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, print Division 1963 
8
 This was led by General J.T.V Aguiyi Ironsi 
9
 See the constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No 1 of 1966 
10
 Agbese P.O. Supra note at p.21  
11
 of 1978 
12
 Davies A.E Supra note at p. 138 
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Particulars of the new local government system, in which among other 
feature traditional rulers have been extricated from the centre of local 
Government operations and converted into informed observes of local 
government1. 
 
 The 1976 reforms however relegated the power of traditional rulers to the local government level and charged 
them with the responsibility of formulating policies and rendering advice to local government on issues of 
development plans and others relating to chieftaincy and control of traditional titles. 
The above exposition no doubt demonstrates a deliberate relegation of the powers of tradition rulers to the grass 
root. 
 
(i) The 1979 Constitution  
The 1979 constitution of Nigeria established a Council of State at the federal level and a council of chiefs at the 
states. The constitution did not provide any administrative role to the traditional rulers. They are to merely serve 
as advisory bodies to the Governor at the state level on matters relating to customary law, inter communal 
relations, chieftaincy, peace and tranquility within their domain.2  
It must be noted that the provision of the 1979 constitution in relation to the powers of traditional rulers is 
imparimateria with that of the 1989 constitution. 
 
Under the 1995 draft constitution, apart from retaining the provisions of the 1979 and 1989 constitution in 
relation to the powers of traditional chiefs, the constitution further added a new role for the   council  of chiefs, to 
the effect that the consent of the state council of chiefs shall be sought by the government in matters of creation 
of new chieftaincy or upgrading of any chief  or making of any law which may improve the security of tenure or 
dignity of traditional institutions.3 This draft constitution further qualified the new roles of the council to the 
extent as not to confer any legislative, executive or judicial function on the council.4  
 
(j) The 1999 Constitution  
The 1999 constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria did make any provision for traditional ruler to exercise 
any political power and neither were they represented in the council of state. Thus the 1999 constitution is the 
most radical in quashing, abrogating and eschewing the traditional chiefs from exercising any political power in 
Nigeria.  
 
IV. MATTERS ARISING FROM ISSUES OF FORMAL 
      CINSTITUTIONAL ROLE FOR TRADITIONAL RULERS 
 
The relevance of traditional institution to governance in Africa has elicited respectable literature and heated 
debate in the post colonial era. The debate has three critical strands: 
 
One highly skeptical strand contends that chieftaincy is anachronistic – a hindrance to the transformation and 
development of African continent, undemocratic, divisive, costly and therefore should be abolished.5   Another 
view contends that traditional institutions are indispensable for political transformation of Africa and they 
represent a major part of Africa’s history, culture and political governance systems.6 A third and more balanced 
view while acknowledging the limitations of tradition institution because of the manner the colonial 
administrators maneuvered them to their advantage, nonetheless, recognizes the fact that traditional institutions 
                                                 
1J.O. Egwurube “Traditional Rulers and modern Local Government in Nigeria – where the problem lies! A paper presented at 
the International Conference on Local Government in West Africa (Ile-Ife; University of Ife Press, 1982) cited in Davies A.E 
Supra at p. 138. 
2
 These powers are as contained in part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1979 Constitution.  
3
 See the federal republic of Nigeria Report of the Constitutional conference containing the draft constitution vol. 1 (Abuja: 
1995) at p. 184 
4
 Ibid  
5
 See a Report of the Economic Commission for Africa on the Relevance of the African Traditional Institutions of  
Governance (2007) at p. 10.  
6
 This view is attributed to the ineffectiveness of the African states to bring about socio-economic development due to its 
neglect of traditional institutions. See generally, Davidson B, Black Man’s Burden (London: James Currey 1992). 
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constitute crucial resources with the potentials of promoting democratic governance and access of rural 
communities to public services.1 
 
Therefore, a critical evaluation of the various strands as borne out by their divergent arguments above has 
provoked further research towards a deeper understanding of the relevance of chieftaincy on the modern 
constitution of African states. 
 
It must be recalled that the core issue and central theme of this paper bothers on allocation of constitutional role 
to traditional rulers. One then wonders whether the agitation is in the national interest or in the interest of the 
subjects or for the selfish interest of the traditional rulers themselves.  
 
The relevance of traditional political institutions in general and traditional ruler ship in particular has continued 
to generate intense and most often, heated and acrimonious debate in Nigeria and other African countries.  This 
has provoked great deal of scholarly interest, and counter interest. The mass media is not left out of the debate. 
 
Many scholars question the need for continued existence of chieftaincy in Africa. In a very expository work in 
chieftaincy in the independent Zambia, Van Binsberg contends that; 
 
                 Chieftaincy is obsolete and should be allowed to die out, as it has in Europe, where its remnant 
(monarchies) can only be seen in the most backward of countries.2  
 
Similarly, Babafemi Badeja and SA Ogunyemi3  maintained; 
The institutions of traditional ruler ship is an historic relic that belongs to antiquity. 
These relics of by gone instruments of oppression which are a constant reminder of 
uneven social development and sociological disunity in Africa are irrelevant to a 
society currently subject to the objective laws of capitalism controlled from the 
western states of capitalism.4  
 
More often than not, many scholars have always blamed the traditional rulers for their convenience with the 
British colonial masters in facilitating colonial exploitation; particularly their participation in the trans-Atlanta 
slave trade5. It has been however contended that the trade was the prevailing global commerce as at then and was 
not considered bad and major continent of the world like America’s, Europe, Asia and Africa was deeply 
involved6 
 
Another skeptical opposition which also emerged is that chiefs often avail their services to both the colonial and 
post colonial state by betraying the responsibility of their communities7  
 
Furthermore, some scholars have vehemently opposed according formal constitutional provision to the 
traditional institution. Their arguments ranges from making them submit to known standards of scrutiny and 
accountability which may debase the traditional institution, duplicating the effort of government, the risk of 
alienation by the subjects, problem of bureaucracy arising from adding another tier of government to the existing 
three tiers of government amongst others8 
 
                                                 
1
   Report of the Economic Commission for Africa supra  at p. 10  
2
 See Van B.W., Chiefs and the state in Independence Zambia “Journal of Legal Plueralism 25 and 26 (1987) pp 156 – 166. 
3
 Babafemi A.B, and Ogunyemi S.A, Integrating the past with the present: A futile exercise? In John A.A.A and Adigun A.B 
(Eds) African Traditional Political thought and institutions (Lagos: Centre for Black African Arts and Civilization, 1989) 
cited in Peter O.A. Supra 
4
 Ibid at p. 183 
5
 See Amusa S.B and Ofuafor  M.O, Supra at p. 409. See also Pita O.A Supra at p 7. 
6
 Ibid, quoting from Curtin P.D The Atlantic Slave Trade 1600-1800, in Ajayi J.F.A and Crowder M., (Eds)  History of west 
Africa (2nd ed) (London: Longman 1976) pp 302-330 
7
 These concerns issues such as exploitation of tributes, labour and tithe on peasant produce amongst others 
8
 See generally Uche N., Supra  at p 7 
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According to Abubakar, traditional rulers do not have any official role to play in the political machinery and 
government in the contemporary Nigeria. At best, they should serve in an unofficial capacity as mere advisory 
body to the local state and federal government functionaries1    
 
Some analysis have equally objected to the provision of formal constitutional roles for traditional rulers for some 
reasons while some are of the opinion that their return to the political thrones would drag them in the mud, others 
believed that royal factors cannot cope with political insults, bickering, prevarications, sabotage and character 
assassination associated with the Nigerian polities, and they should rather concentrate on the discharge of duties 
imposed on them by local traditions2  
 
Some political analysts have maintained that drafting the royal fathers into politics amounts to waking up the 
sleeping dogs stating that modern democracy has come to halt the dictatorship of few which does not preclude 
traditional rulers and Wada Nas, former minister for special Duties  categorically stated that traditional rulers 
should not have a role in the Nigerian constitution. Since traditional authority presupposes the absence of 
democracy and a hereditary institution is unsuitable for democratic practices.3   
 
Not withstanding the fact that many scholarly writings as demonstrated above vehemently question the 
continued existence of traditional  institutions in modern society,  there are equally plethora of evidence to the 
contrary as several reasons have been adduced for the survival of chieftaincy against all odds. 
 
In the words of late General Sani Abacha:   
“The institution of traditional rulers is an enduring part of our heritage. It plays a 
critical role as the custodian of culture and traditions. Expectedly, our traditional 
rulers are closely linked to the grassroots, and so understand the problems of our 
people intimately. In our search for peace, order and stability in our society, the 
institution could be a veritable instrument. It is in the overall interest of our people, 
that this institution in our national life be acknowledged and a clear provisions are 
made (in the constitution) for its functions.4  
 
In a similar view, it has been posited that: 
“….rather than throw the baby away with the (bath) water, African traditional 
political institutions only need to be purged of colonial accretion, not scrapped. Such 
institutions were well-suited to the African situation in the pre-colonial era, and they 
can indeed be used positively to enhance African identity and dignity in the post 
colonial era.5 
 
It has been further adumbrated that traditional institutions are indispensable for the political history of Africa. 
This view has been attributed to the ineffectiveness of African states in bringing about sustained socio-economic 
development to the neglect of the traditional institution, and its failure to restore Africa’s own history,6 ;that 
political and economic development would be more successful when rated upon widely shared institutions and 
cultural values.7  
                                                 
1
 Abubarkar S., The Established Caliphatic Sokoto, the Emirates and their neighbors in Ikime O. (ed) Ground work of 
Nigerian History (Ibadan: Heineman Educational Publishers 1980) pp: 303-326, cited in Amusa S.B and Ofuafor M.O Supra 
note at p 407 
2
 Oladesu M., What Role For Traditional Rulers. Online nation Newspaper posted on Jan 8, 2013.  
3
 Ahmed T,I Traditional Rulers in Contemporary Nigerian society available at http://news.biafrmegenanworld.com accessed 
on 9/14/2014 
4
 Extract of the text of Addresses presented by late General Sani Abacha, former Head of State,  
    Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, on the inauguration of the  
    National Constitutional Conference, Abuja, June 27th 1994 cited in Pita O.A Supra at p. 1. 
5
 Iyortange T., the Evolution of political institutions among the Tiv of Nigeria and the question of  
   Relevance, In Ayoade and Agbaje (Eds) African Traditional Political thought and institutions p. 173  
6
 See Davidson B. Supra 
7
 Fallers L. the predicament of the modern African Chief: An instance from Uganda “American  
    Anthropologist, New Series. 57 No.2 (April 1995) pp 290 – 305. Cited in Report of Economic  
    Commission for Africa Supra at p.11. 
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In Nigeria, it is a corroborative fact that whenever the policy makers are overwhelmed by a sense of inadequacy 
in carrying the masses along with them on some critical issues with dare consequences the assistance of 
traditional rulers is always resorted to.1 No wonder that the traditional institution has been described as the most 
effective channel by which the federal and state governments reach the people in rural areas.2 
  
Among other arguments posited for the continued existence of traditional institution  ranges from its tendency to 
provide the bedrock upon which modern governance can be constructed, advocating for the interest of the local 
community; 3  serving as a strong philosophical basis for accountability in governance 4 ; articulation of the 
indigenous political values and practices and their harmonization with the modern democratic practices.5 
 
According to Tonah, several reasons account for the survival of chieftaincy against all odds. These includes the 
continuing allegiance of large sections of the population including the elites to their traditional leadership, the 
inability of  the states to create a national identity out of the numerous ethnic groups who have been forced 
together with a nation state; the continuing association of chieftaincy with power and wealth; and the flexibility 
of the institution and ability to adapt to the changing political order of the post colonial period.6 That is why 
another scholar also lend his voice to the submission above that in the light of the comparative failure of the 
African states to bring about democracy and development, having being undermined by greedy and violent 
political elite, chieftaincy has re-emerged as an important vehicle for authentic indigenous political expression.7 
 
Domestically, in the contemporary Nigeria, the claim and agitation for a constitutional provision and recognition 
for traditional institution is in the best interest of the country. By virtue civilization, modernization and 
education, traditional institution cannot be relegated to the dust of history. In fact, wealthy, powerful and well 
known Nigerians have now surfaced with considerable interest in the traditional ruler ship and are now 
vigorously contesting the various thrones. Some have even placed the traditional stool on a high pedestal than 
the office of State Governors or other leadership positions in Nigeria.8 
 
At present, both the Federal and State Governments attach much importance to the traditional institution by 
appointing some of them into prominent positions.9 
 
It is very material to note that the stool of traditional institution in most African countries in general and Nigeria 
in particular is no longer business as usual. Today, many traditional rulers are so learned sound and are great 
intellectuals of various disciplines. Incorporating them in governance would no doubt lead to productivity 
because of their rich talents and wealth of experience.  For example, the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emir of Gwandu, 
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3Olufemi V. (ed) Indigenous; political structures and Governance in Africa (Ibadan: Sefer, 2003) pp.3-25 
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4
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    Ghana) Arthropods  
7
 See Ray, D.E, Van Nieuwall; and Adrian B, The New Relevance of Traditional Authority in Africa:  
    Reflections on Chieftaincy in Africa: Future Directions. Journal of legal Pheralism 37 (38) at pp 1-38 
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 For instance, the late Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, who once aspired to the sultanate openly said  
    that if he was asked to choose between the presidency of Nigeria and the sultanate, he would most  
     willingly and gladly settle for the later. See generally Mohammed Y, God or man’s case. Newswatch  
     November, 21, 1998 at p.6.  
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 Such as chancellors of various universities, for example, the Emir of Zaria, the Oba of Benin, Emir of  
    Kano, Obi of Onitsha and the late Attah of Igala Ach. Abigu Obaje are chancellors of various  
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the Etsu Nupe, and the Emir of Zuru were Generals in the Nigerian Army. The Oba of Lagos was a police AIG, 
the Gbong Gwom of Jos was a police DIG. The Emir of Kazure holds a Ph.D in Law and the Asaba of Asaba is a 
Professor. In fact today, most Emirs and Chiefs like the current Emirs of Kano Mall. Sanusis Lamido who was 
the immediate past Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. Others had served in the public service of states 
and the federation1. 
 
Recounting an indelible encounter with one of the Nigerian foremost traditional ruler, Uche Nworah has this to 
say: 
Anyone who has had the opportunity of interacting with our traditional rulers will readily 
agree that some of them are sound and first class individuals. Recently, I had the 
opportunity of sharing a space with the Alafin of Oyo, Oba Lamidi Adeyemi in 2007 
Edition of the gathering of Africans Best (GAB) award in London. It was my first time of 
meeting the Alafin, and must say that he held me and the audience spell-bound that night 
with his masterful speech…. The standing ovation he received afterwards may not be 
enough to thank him for showing some of us the other side of traditional rulers. An 
intelligent side, a side that shows that traditional rulers can also be men of great 
intelligence and sound minds.2    
 
The scholar also recounted his experience with Igwe Osita Agwuna Igwe of Umunri and Eze Enugwu-Ukwu as 
drinking from a fountain of knowledge. He pondered why such erudite rulers should be idling away at their 
palaces and not made part of the Nigerian renaissance with specific roles assigned to them in the constitution.3   
 
V. EFFORT OF SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIONS 
Following the erosion of political relevance of traditional institution by the 1979 constitution, the farmers of the 
1989 and 1999 draft constitution did not provide any constitutional roles for traditional institution in Nigeria.   
 
In spite of this relegation, traditional rulers still have and are still having modicum of recognition under 
successive administration in Nigeria. For instance, the General Sani Abacha led automatic regime had decreed 
that 55% out of the statutory allocation of local government should set aside for the upkeep of traditional 
institution in such local government areas.4  
 
In 1986, President Ibrahim Babangida set up a Political Bureau Committee to ascertain Political Preferences of 
Nigerians. The committee received many memoranda on the role of traditional rulers and the need for a 
constitutional provision for it.5   
 
As noted earlier, both federal and state governments in Nigeria emphasize the importance of traditional 
institution by appointing men to serve in various capacities. Today, State governments are creating new 
traditional thrones. For example, in 1997, the Benue State Government created several new second-class stools 
in the state which had no precedent in the political experience of the people and had no connection with the pre 
colonial existing traditional stool.   
 
At the federal level, a new institution called the Nations Council of Traditional Rulers was created to serve as a 
consultative assembly through which the Federal Government could feel the pulse of grassroot communities.6 
 
During a condolence visit to the Shehu of Borno over the death of his brother, Senator David Mark was quoted 
thus: 
                                                 
1
 Ibid 
2
 See Uche N., The Role of Traditional Rulers in Emerging Democratic Nigeria (Supra) at p.1 
3
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4
 Amusa S.B., and Ofuafor M.O., Supra at p.410 
5
 See Feder Government of Nigeria Report of the Political Bureau. (Abuja: MAMSER, 1978), at p.147 
cited in Pita O.A. Supra at p.2. 
6
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“We will continue to assists our traditional rulers and leaders who are responsible for unity, 
peace in order to further strength their roles. We shall find specific roles for them in the 
constitution when we finally review the 1999 constitution”.1  
 
Further on the agitation, the former President Olusegun Obasanjo had earlier in the last lap of his administration 
led a promotional campaign on the need to constitutionally empower traditional rulers2.  
 
Similarly, late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua equally proposed new constitutional roles for traditional rulers 
during his term which had  provoked fresh debate on the significance of the traditional institution in the country.3 
 
At various levels, many royal fathers have been on the forefront agitation for political, administrative and 
advisory roles under the proposed constitutional amendment. In the face of the on-going deliberations at the 
National Conference and the evolving constitutional amendment process embarked upon by the National 
Assembly, the demand by traditional rulers for specific constitutional rulers have also been reinforced.4   
 
VI. LESSONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
 
Apart from the fact that traditional institutions evolved during the pre colonial era, the institution has survived 
transformed and has become indispensable in many countries of Africa, and even other non African states. It is 
therefore imperative at to make a comparative assessment of the prevailing practices and experience of these 
countries in juxtaposition with the practice in Nigeria. It must be noted, however that the constitutional 
experience of some homogenous states like Japan may not be directly relevant to Nigeria which is characterized 
with cultural diversity and plural chieftaincy stools. 
 
Across Africa, there are several kinds of chieftaincies as well as different approaches by government at 
incorporating them into existing, new, emerging, and developing democratic structures.5 There is an urgent need 
to consider the relevant enactments regulating chieftaincy institution in some of these countries. 
 
(a) Ghana: 
In Ghana, chieftaincy remains a very critical institution of government and has been upheld as an institution that 
will remain a very important part of the Ghanaian governance as a way of identifying the people’s cultural 
heritage. It is the only institution to reckon with when national bureaucratic structures have failed. 
Over the years Ghana has so much enjoyed the co-operation and support of its traditional institution for a range 
of developmental efforts to the extent of incorporating  the institution into its constitution. 
Article 270(1) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana emphatically provides:  
“The institution of chieftaincy, together with its traditional councils as established by 
customary law and usage, is hereby guaranteed”. 
 
The constitution further defines a chief “as a person who, hailing from the appropriate family or lineage 
has been validly nominated, elected, or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or 
queen-mother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage.6  
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3
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    http://theunion.com.ngaccessedon  accessed on 14/9/2014. 
5
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6
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Ghanaian constitution also established Regional and National House of Chief with earmarked functions,1 and are 
expressly prohibited from partisan policies2  Chief who wishes to venture into politics are required to abdicate 
their stool.  
In earnest, the Ghanaian constitution vests all stool lands in the appropriate stool on behalf of and in trust for the 
subjects of the stool in accordance with customary law and usage.3   
Therefore in the present day Ghana, chieftaincy stool plays complimentary role to the government and it is the 
most cherished and visible institution of governance with different grades and spools spread across every town 
villages. The chiefs are responsible for maintaining law and order.  
 
b. South Africa 
In South Africa, despite the fact the chiefs were accused of cooperating with the successive government during 
the successive apartheid era, several legislations have been enacted to validate the traditional institution. The 
new South African constitution 4  also contains safeguard for the traditional institution. The existence oft 
multiparty system in South Africa has also been adduced as one of the reasons for the survival and recognition 
resulted chieftaincy over the years. The constitution provides for the establishment of the House of Traditional 
Leaders of the provincial and National level.5  
Earlier in 1986, the legal and constitutional committee of the ANC produced a set of constitutional guidelines 
prescribing that hereditary rulers conform with the principles of democracy embodied in the constitution and its 
Bill of Rights; and abolished all forms of inequality and discriminating that hitherto dominated the institution.6 
Article 183/184 of the 1993 South African Constitution provides for a limited recognition of traditional rules and 
Houses of Traditional Leaders were established both at the National and Provincial Levels,  and charged with the 
responsibility of providing advisory role for both the government and the legislature in matters relating to native 
law and custom. 
Under Article 182, a traditional ruler is made the leader of the community with the responsibility of observing 
indigenous laws pertaining to land within his jurisdiction, and he is equally made an ex- officio of the local 
government and can be elected to any office of such local government.7  
Furthermore, Chapter 12 of the 1996 constitution of South Africa specifically acknowledges the institution of 
traditional leadership and the role in democratic governance and went further to reinforce its continued authority 
and functioning in accordance will traditional law within the broader legal framework.  
It must be noted that prior to and after the constitution was being finalized, there are other several legislations in 
South Africa aimed at recognizing and reinforcing the power the traditional institution.8 
c. Malawi: 
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In Malawi, the constitution provide for specific roles for the traditional rulers by mandating the election of 24 
chiefs to its 80 member senate and each of them is to be elected by a caucus of all the chiefs in the district by a 
secret ballot system within 30 days of each local government election.1  
d. Botswana: 
The 1966 independence constitution of Botswana created a House of chiefs to serve as a consultative body to the 
government in respect of tribal matters.2 
e. Swaziland: 
Swaziland has been mobilizing its traditional rulers in development initiatives.3 This is because the chiefs know 
their subjects and what is going on in their areas better than any other person.4 
f. Japan: 
In Japan, the emperor performs ceremonial functions and the constitution designates him as the symbol of the 
state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people.5  
g. Malaysia: 
The constitution of Malaysia provides for specific roles for traditional institution. It provides for a conference of 
Traditional Rulers,6 comprising of all Royal Highnesses with outlines function7 and may also deliberate and 
question of any national policy and matters that it thinks fit.  
h. Uganda: 
Although Uganda had earlier witnessed fluctuation in the power of traditional institution, the status of his four 
chieftaincy kingdoms was constitutionally established by the 1962 constitution 8 . Furthermore, the 1995 
constitution of Uganda restored the constitutional status of traditional ruler ship.9 The constitution explicitly 
provides for chieftaincy institution in the whole country in accordance with the peculiar custom, culture, 
tradition, wishes and aspirations of the people to whom it applies.10 It equally empowers national parliament to 
prescribe methods of resolving chieftaincy disputes and permits the traditional institution to enjoy rights and 
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privileges entitled to from the government or under the native law and custom.1 Citizens are not to be compelled 
to pay allegiance or contribute to the cost of maintenance of a traditional leader. All traditional and cultural 
leaders are expressly prohibited from participating in politics and cannot exercise any administrative, legislative 
or executive powers of government or local government.2 
Under the constitution, any custom, practice, usage or tradition which detracts from the rights of citizens 
guaranteed by the constitution are prohibited.3 
i. Zimbabwe: 
The Zimbabwean constitution of 1985 provides for constitution status for its traditional rulers and empowers the 
president to appoint chiefs in accordance with acts of parliaments after due consideration to the customary 
principles of succession of the tribes people over which the chief will preside.4  
The constitution equally provides for a council of chiefs5 and empowers the parliament to prescribe qualification 
of candidates for election into the council of chiefs and equally determine the tenure of such candidates. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
No community in the world can achieve peace, order, stability and development without defined norms and 
values. This paper has, no doubt examined the travails of traditional institution in Nigeria and has equally drawn 
from the experiences of some other jurisdictions. There is no doubt that the traditional institution is an integral 
part of the socio cultural heritage of Africa. In spite of the lacunae in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria on the roles of traditional institution, the overall welfare of the institution, appointment, 
upgrading, presentation of staff of office and deposition of chiefs is now the responsibility of government at all 
levels. As seen from the preceding discussion, traditional rulers have acted and are still acting as agents of 
cohesion, peace, dispute management, reconciliation, religious tolerance, and land administration in many 
African countries. To exclude the institution out of the constitutional framework of Nigeria would surely impact 
effective governance. That is why the loss of direction, prevailing state of poverty, frequent electoral and post 
electoral strife, persistent and widespread ethnic and civil conflicts, corruption and maladministration which 
characterize most African states have been attributed to the failure to fully integrate the traditional institution in 
governance.6 Therefore, in the bid to reconstruct the new Nigeria, there is need to align the traditional institution 
of governance with the modern structures. The proposed amendment of the 1999 Constitution should consider 
making provision for the traditional institution with designated roles. 
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